Policy entrepreneurs in Brussels, tied hands at home? EU member states between joint policy-making and domestic implementation in development co-operation

Abstract

Member states of the European Union (EU) often agree on common policies which are not legally binding and for which there is no enforcement. In these cases, policy networks arguably increase the capacity and political leverage for national compliance. Yet, vertical links between levels often remain weak, resulting in limited national adaptation. How can the gap between common policy-making within the EU and lacking implementation ‘at home’ be explained? Looking at ‘joint programming’ in EU development co-operation, this contribution analyses (1) how policy professionals have engaged as policy entrepreneurs in Brussels; and (2) in how far such a common policy principle is compatible on ideational and administrative grounds ‘back home’. Based on insights from France and Germany, this contribution argues that, despite ideational resonance that motivates joint policy construction, procedural and structural incompatibility exacerbate national implementation