Public sector bureaucracies and economic growth

  1. Jorge Onrubia 2
  2. Javier J. Pérez 1
  3. A. Jesús Sánchez-Fuentes 2
  1. 1 Banco de España
    info

    Banco de España

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02f26yq04

  2. 2 Universidade de Vigo
    info

    Universidade de Vigo

    Vigo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05rdf8595

Revista:
Revista de economía mundial

ISSN: 1576-0162

Año de publicación: 2019

Número: 51

Páginas: 121-138

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.33776/REM.V0I51.3906 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openArias Montano editor

Otras publicaciones en: Revista de economía mundial

Resumen

Las burocracias del sector público son actores clave en las economías avanzadas, como en el caso de los países de la Unión Europea, para el buen funcionamiento de los papeles asignados a los gobiernos (proporcionar servicios y prestaciones del Estado de Bienestar, infraestructuras públicas y diseño del marco jurídico y económico institucional). Desde esta perspectiva, el buen funcionamiento de la burocracia pública es crucial para el crecimiento potencial. Por lo tanto, las diferencias entre países en la calidad de las burocracias pueden explicar las diferencias en el crecimiento económico. En consecuencia, la existencia de “burocracias con intereses propios” puede llevar a políticas fiscales inadecuadas, a la captura regulatoria o al mal funcionamiento del mercado laboral, dañando los incentivos y generando importantes costes de eficiencia. Dos son los objetivos de este artículo. En primer lugar, revisamos la literatura existente, centrándonos en los principales canales de la relación entre burocracia y crecimiento. Y en segundo, ofrecemos un ejercicio empírico que ilustra los vínculos entre la calidad burocrática/institucional y el crecimiento económico.

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Información de financiación

J. Onrubia acknowledges the financial support of Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (project ECO2016-76506-C4-3-R). Sánchez-Fuertes acknowledges the financial support of the Regional Government of Andalusia (project SEJ 1512)

Financiadores

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