Many-to-one matching when the colleagues do matter
- Bilbao Arrese, Jesús Mario (coord.)
- Fernández García, Francisco Ramón (coord.)
Éditorial: Universidad de Sevilla
ISBN: 84-472-0733-1
Année de publication: 2002
Pages: 51
Type: Chapitre d'ouvrage
Résumé
This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent�s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on her colleagues, that are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptyness of the core is not guaranteed. We present some conditions on agents� preferences, that determines two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists. The first one reflects real-life situations in which the agents are more worried about an acceptable set of colleagues that the frim hiring them. The second one is related to markets in which a workers� ranking is accepted by everyone (workers and firms) in the market.