Multicriteria Linear Bargaining Games

Resumen

Bargaining games are inherently multicriteria problems. This multicriteria nature is even more evident if each agent has to take into account several criteria when deciding which of the feasible solutions it is convenient to agree on. In this paper we consider the class of multicriteria linear bargaining games. In these games the payoff set is defined by linear constraints, and the coordinates of the joint payoff space are split in different subsets corresponding to the criteria of the agents. These linear bargaining models are important because they can represent directly a wide range of applications. In general, it is difficult to deal with multicriteria bargaining games due to the double multidimensionality involved. Nevertheless, in this paper we will exploit the special properties of the problem derived from the linearity in order to establish procedures to obtain, both the disagreement points and the solutions for this class of bargaining problems. We illustrate the ideas with the analysis of a finite n-person game with multiple payoffs as a multicriteria bargaining game.