Soluciones Estables en Juegos Cooperativos bajo Incertidumbre.

  1. Borrero Molina, Diego Vicente
  2. Hinojosa Ramos, Miguel Ángel
  3. Mármol Conde, Amparo M.
Journal:
Anales de ASEPUMA

ISSN: 2171-892X

Year of publication: 2013

Issue: 21

Type: Article

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Abstract

Multiple scenario cooperative games model situations where the worth of the coalitions is valued in several scenarios simultaneously or under di erent states of nature. We focus on the identification of those allocations which are stable in the sense that agents have no incentives to abandon the group. The stability of an allocation depends on how the quantities the coalitions obtain are compared with the vector-valued worth of the coalition, therefore, diferent extensions of the notion of core emerge, depending on how these comparisons are made. We introduce the new notions of weighting cores and analize the relationships between them and the existing core solutions. We also address the inclusion in the model of partial information about the probabilities of occurrence of the scenarios. In order to identify allocations which are also stable in the presence of probability information, we extend the notions of core to this new setting, and provide results which permit the efective calculation of the corresponding sets of allocations.

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