Reglas leximin para problemas de bancarrota con incertidumbre*

  1. Sánchez Sánchez, Francisca J. 1
  2. Hinojosa Ramos, Miguel A. 1
  3. Mármol Conde, Amparo M. 2
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info

    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

  2. 2 Universidad de Sevilla
    info

    Universidad de Sevilla

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03yxnpp24

Revista:
Anales de ASEPUMA

ISSN: 2171-892X

Año de publicación: 2012

Número: 20

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Anales de ASEPUMA

Resumen

En este trabajo modelizamos los problemas de bancarrota en condiciones de in-certidumbre, bajo el supuesto de que hay varios posibles estados de la naturaleza, identificándose cada uno de ellos con un problema de bancarrota diferente. Para esta extensión multidimensional de los problemas clásicos de bancarrota, consideramos situaciones en las que los agentes presentan preferencias de tipo aditivo y leximin sobre los posibles resultados. Proponemos reglas de reparto en las que se combinan diferentes principios de racionalidad y se garantiza la eficiencia con respecto a las preferencias de tipo leximin.

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