Reglas leximin para problemas de bancarrota con incertidumbre*

  1. Sánchez Sánchez, Francisca J. 1
  2. Hinojosa Ramos, Miguel A. 1
  3. Mármol Conde, Amparo M. 2
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info
    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

    Geographic location of the organization Universidad Pablo de Olavide
  2. 2 Universidad de Sevilla
    info
    Universidad de Sevilla

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03yxnpp24

    Geographic location of the organization Universidad de Sevilla
Journal:
Anales de ASEPUMA

ISSN: 2171-892X

Year of publication: 2012

Issue: 20

Type: Article

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor HANDLE: https://hdl.handle.net/11441/80724

More publications in: Anales de ASEPUMA

Abstract

We model bankruptcy problems under uncertainty under the assumption that there are several possible states of nature, each of which is identified with a di®er-ent bankruptcy problem. For this multi-dimensional extension of classic bankruptcy problems, we consider situations in which agents exhibit at the same time additive preferences and leximin preferences on their possible results. We propose division rules which combine di®erent rationality principles and guarantee eÿciency with respect to leximin preferences.

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