Un algoritmo para el cálculo de asignaciones en el problema de división con referencias múltiples.

  1. Sánchez Sánchez, Francisca J. 1
  2. Hinojosa Ramos, Miguel A. 1
  3. Mármol Conde, Amparo M. 2
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info

    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

  2. 2 Universidad de Sevilla
    info

    Universidad de Sevilla

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03yxnpp24

Revista:
Anales de ASEPUMA

ISSN: 2171-892X

Ano de publicación: 2011

Número: 19

Tipo: Artigo

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Outras publicacións en: Anales de ASEPUMA

Resumo

In this paper we consider an extension of the classic division problem with claims, the division problem with multiple references. For this problem, we have designed a Talmudic rule that takes into account the multidimensionality of the agents' references. We propose an algorithm to compute the allocations induced by the rule and present computational results.

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