Reglas igualitarias para los problemas de reparto con referencias múltiples

  1. Francisca J. Sanchez 1
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info

    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

Journal:
Revista de métodos cuantitativos para la economía y la empresa

ISSN: 1886-516X

Year of publication: 2016

Volume: 22

Pages: 250-262

Type: Article

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More publications in: Revista de métodos cuantitativos para la economía y la empresa

Abstract

We consider the division problems in which a resource must be distributed considering agents' references. We analize this problems in a multidimensional context, we consider that agents have multiple references. For division of the amount available in these situations, we design rules that take into account the multidimensionality of the references of each agent. We propose and we analyze different rules based on an egalitarian principle and provide a procedure for the selection of a single allocation

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