Cuando la realidad supera la ficciónla operación RYAN (1981-1991)

  1. Colom Piella, Guillem 1
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info

    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

Aldizkaria:
Ayer

ISSN: 1134-2277,  2255-5838

Argitalpen urtea: 2018

Zenbakia: 112

Orrialdeak: 265-293

Mota: Artikulua

DOI: 10.55509/AYER/112-2018-11 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Beste argitalpen batzuk: Ayer

Garapen Iraunkorreko Helburuak

Laburpena

RYAN was the largest intelligence operation carried out by the Soviet Union in its history. Active between 1981 and the fall of the Iron Curtain, this mission was intended to detect, prevent and neutralize a suprise nuclear missile attack. In 1983, coinciding with the NATO manoeuvres Able Archer 83, the worst Soviet fears seemed to come true and Moscow prepared to launch a pre-emptive strike. Based on recently declassified primary sources, this article analyses those incidents that put the world on the brink of a nuclear holocaust.

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