Elección de managers y comportamiento sancionador en la empresa: un análisis experimental

  1. Natalia Jiménez 13
  2. Ángel Solano García 2
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info

    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

  2. 2 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

  3. 3 Middlesex University
    info

    Middlesex University

    Londres, Reino Unido

    ROR https://ror.org/01rv4p989

Montrer des affiliations +
Revue:
Economía industrial

ISSN: 0422-2784

Année de publication: 2019

Titre de la publication: Economía conductual

Número: 413

Pages: 73-84

Type: Article

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAccès ouvert editor

D'autres publications dans: Economía industrial

Résumé

This paper analyzes through a public good provision game how the sanctioning behavior of agents varies depending on whether they are democratically elected or not. The experimental setting is applied to a particular case of a company in which the external judges are the managers; voters represent workers; and the public good is the teamwork output which is distributed among workers. The main conclusion is that managers increase their efforts in terms of monitoring and punishment when they are democratically elected.

€ Voir financement

Information sur le financement

Los autores de este artículo agradecen considerablemente la ayuda financiera proporcionada por el Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO ECO2016-76789-P).

Financeurs

Références bibliographiques

  • CHARNESS, G.; COBO-REYES, R.; y JIMENEZ, N. (2008). «An Investment game with Third Party Intervention». Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 68, pp. 18-28.
  • FEHR, E. y FISCHBACHER, U. (2004). «Third-party punishment and social norms». Evolution and Human Behavior, vol. 25, pp. 63-87.
  • FEHR, E. y GÄCHTER, S. (2002). «Altruistic Punishment in Humans». Nature, vol. 415, pp. 137-140.
  • FISCHBACHER, U. (2007). «z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments». Experimental Economics, vol. 10, nº 2, pp. 171-178.
  • GÜRERK, Ö.; IRLENBUSCH, B. y ROCKENBACH, B. (2006). «The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions». Science, vol. 312, pp. 108-111.
  • HAMMAN, J.R.; WEBER, R.A. y WOON, J. (2011). «An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods». American Journal of Political Science, vol. 55, nº 4, pp. 737-751.
  • KROLL, S.; CHERRY, T.L. y SHOGREN, J.F. (2007). «Voting, Punishment, And Public Goods». Economic Inquiry, vol. 45, nº 3, pp. 557-570.
  • LOPEZ-PEREZ, R. y LEIBBRANDT, A. (2011). «The dark side of altruistic third party punishment». Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 55, nº 5, pp. 761-784.
  • MCKELVEY, RD. y ORDESHOOK, P.C. (1983). «Some Experimental Results That Fail to Support the Competitive Solution». Public Choice, vol. 40, nº 3, pp. 281-291.
  • MORTON R. (1993). «Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence». American Political Science Review, vol. 87, nº 2, pp. 382-392. PAGE, E.B. (1963). «Ordered Hypotheses for Multiple
  • Treatments: A Significance Test for Linear Ranks». Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 58, nº301, pp. 216-230.
  • ROEMER, J. (2001). «Political Competition: Theory and Applications». Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
  • WOON, J. (2014). «An Experimental Study of Electoral Incentives and Institutional Choice». Journal of Experimental Political Science, vol. 1, nº 2, pp. 181-200.
La source de données: Dialnet