A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references

  1. M.A. Hinojosa 1
  2. A.M. Mármol 2
  3. F. Sánchez 1
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide, España
  2. 2 Universidad de Sevilla, España
Revista:
Top

ISSN: 1863-8279 1134-5764

Any de publicació: 2012

Volum: 20

Número: 3

Pàgines: 661-678

Tipus: Article

Altres publicacions en: Top

Resum

We consider an extension of the classic division problem with claims, division problems with multiple references. We show that the theory of cooperative games is able to provide a single-valued allocation rule for this class of problems. Moreover, this rule can be related with the Talmud rule for the classic division problem, as in Aumann and Maschler (J. Econ. Theory 36, 195–213, 1985). Finally, we establish the consistency and other basic properties of the rule.

Informació de finançament

Acknowledgements This research has been partially financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology project SEJ2007-62711, and by the Consejería de Innovación de la Junta de Andalucía, project P06-SEJ-01801.