Pensamiento militar ruso y suposiciones sobre la zona gris y la guerra en Ucrania

  1. Guillem Colom Piella 1
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide, España. Universidad Autónoma de Chile
Revista de Pensamiento Estratégico y Seguridad CISDE

ISSN: 2529-8763

Year of publication: 2023

Volume: 8

Issue: 2

Pages: 91-103

Type: Article

More publications in: Revista de Pensamiento Estratégico y Seguridad CISDE


On 24 February 2022, Russia launched its 'special military operation' in Ukraine. What was probably planned as a regime-change operation has resulted in the largest conflict on the European continent since World War II. While the factors that led President Putin to make this decision and escalate the grey zone that apparently allowed Moscow to maintain the status quo and control any escalation are unknown, it is possible to outline the Russian military-strategic developments and present the hypotheses that could have guided this failed coup.

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