Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes:how much difference does unemployment make?

  1. Martínez López, Diego
  2. Sjögren, Tomas
Llibre:
XX Encuentro Economía Pública: estado del bienestar. Sostenibilidad y reformas

Editorial: Universidad de Sevilla

ISBN: 978-84-695-6945-0

Any de publicació: 2013

Pàgines: 65

Congrés: Encuentro de Economía Pública (20. 2013. Sevilla)

Tipus: Aportació congrés

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Resum

This paper analyses how the existence of unemployment a§ects the conventional ap- proach to vertical externalities. We discuss the optimality rule for the provision of public inputs both in an unitary and a federal country. Our Öndings show that decentralizing the spending responsability on public inputs can bring its optimality rule closer to the production e¢ ciency condition. Moreover, we describe the inability of the federal gov- ernment, behaving as Stackelberg leader, to replicate the unitary outcome, unless to have new policy instruments at governmentís disposal

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet