Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes:how much difference does unemployment make?
- Martínez López, Diego
- Sjögren, Tomas
Verlag: Universidad de Sevilla
ISBN: 978-84-695-6945-0
Datum der Publikation: 2013
Seiten: 65
Kongress: Encuentro de Economía Pública (20. 2013. Sevilla)
Art: Konferenz-Beitrag
Zusammenfassung
This paper analyses how the existence of unemployment a§ects the conventional ap- proach to vertical externalities. We discuss the optimality rule for the provision of public inputs both in an unitary and a federal country. Our Öndings show that decentralizing the spending responsability on public inputs can bring its optimality rule closer to the production e¢ ciency condition. Moreover, we describe the inability of the federal gov- ernment, behaving as Stackelberg leader, to replicate the unitary outcome, unless to have new policy instruments at governmentís disposal