Composition, securement, and concede-and-divide

  1. Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
Revista:
Spanish economic review

ISSN: 1435-5469

Año de publicación: 2006

Volumen: 8

Número: 3

Páginas: 227-237

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1007/S10108-006-9003-1 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Otras publicaciones en: Spanish economic review

Resumen

Concede-and-divide is a widely accepted procedure to solve the problem of adjudicating two conflicting claims. In this paper we show that this procedure can be characterized by combining three standard properties in the literature: self-duality, lower securement, and restricted composition up. We also show that self-duality can be replaced by the dual properties of lower securement and restricted composition up and that both characterization results are tight.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet