Appointing high-court judges by political parties

  1. Nicolás Porteiro 1
  2. Antonio Villar 1
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info

    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

Zeitschrift:
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

ISSN: 1869-4195

Datum der Publikation: 2015

Ausgabe: 6

Nummer: 1

Seiten: 91-99

Art: Artikel

DOI: 10.1007/S13209-014-0118-6 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen Access editor

Andere Publikationen in: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung

Zusammenfassung

This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the possibility that political parties may block the nomination of High-Court judges when the Parliament is involved in their nomination and theirmandate expires on a fixed date. This possibility arises when the default option is that the judge whose mandate expires holds office until an agreement is reached. Our proposal consists of changing the default option by a weighted lottery, related to the shares in Parliament of the different parties.We show that this mechanism is capable of solving the problem under reasonable conditions and implementing a politically balanced solution.