Appointing high-court judges by political parties

  1. Nicolás Porteiro 1
  2. Antonio Villar 1
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info

    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

Revue:
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

ISSN: 1869-4195

Année de publication: 2015

Volumen: 6

Número: 1

Pages: 91-99

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1007/S13209-014-0118-6 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAccès ouvert editor

D'autres publications dans: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

Objectifs de Développement Durable

Résumé

This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the possibility that political parties may block the nomination of High-Court judges when the Parliament is involved in their nomination and theirmandate expires on a fixed date. This possibility arises when the default option is that the judge whose mandate expires holds office until an agreement is reached. Our proposal consists of changing the default option by a weighted lottery, related to the shares in Parliament of the different parties.We show that this mechanism is capable of solving the problem under reasonable conditions and implementing a politically balanced solution.