Cuando la realidad supera la ficciónla operación RYAN (1981-1991)

Referencias bibliográficas

• «Brink of World War III: When the World Almost Went to War», Sunday Telegraph, 16 de octubre de 1988.
• George Shultz: Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, Nueva York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993, p. 464.
• Vojtech Mastny: «How Able Was “Able Archer”? Nuclear Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective», Journal of Cold War Studies, 11-1 (2009), pp. 108-123.
• Nate Jones: «One Misstep Could Trigger a Great War»: Operation RYAN, Able Archer 83, and the 1983 War Scare, Washington DC, George Washington University Press, 2009.
• Anatoly Dobrynin: In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents, Nueva York, Random House, 1995, pp. 501-503.
• Beth Fischer: The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1997, pp. 332-334.
• Ronald Reagan: An American Life: The Autobiography, Nueva York, Simon & Schuster, 1990, p. 585.
• Robert Gates: From the Shadows: the Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War, Nueva York, Simon & Schuster, 1997, p. 273.
• Jack Snyder: The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options, Santa Mónica, RAND, 1977.
• Peter Burt: Thirty Years ago: The Nuclear Crisis which Frightened Thatcher and Reagan into Ending the Cold War, Nuclear Information Service, 2013.
• Benjamin Fischer: A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare, Langley, CIA Center or the Study of Intelligence, 1997, www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm
• Bernd Schaefer, Nate Jones y Benjamin Fischer: Forecasting Nuclear War: Stasi/KGB Intelligence Cooperation under Project RYAN, Washington DC, Wilson Center, 2014,
• Alexandra Grunova (ed.): NKVD/KGB Activities and its Cooperation with other Secret Services in Central and Eastern Europe 1945-1989, Bratislava, Nation’s Memory Institute, 2008.
• Francisco Veiga, Enrique Ucelay y Ángel Duarte: La paz simulada: una historia de la Guerra Fría, 1941-1991, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1997;
• Ronald Powaski: La Guerra Fría: Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética, 1917-1991, Barcelona, Crítica, 2000,
• Simon Ball: The Cold War: An International History, 1947-1991, Londres, Arnold, 1998.
• Richard Leighton: The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: A Case Study in National Security Crisis Management, Washington DC, National Defense University, 1978.
• Yuri Shvets: Washington Station: My Life as a KGB Spy in America, Nueva York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 74.
• Bill Gertz: «KGB halts lookout for US nuclear attack», Washington Times, 28 de noviembre de 1991.
• Christopher Andrew y Oleg Gordievsky: KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, Nueva York, Harper Collins, 1990, p. 583,
• Oleg Kalugin: The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West, Nueva York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 302.
• Victor Chebrikov: Informe anual del trabajo del KGB en 1982, 547-CH/OB, 15 de marzo de 1982, p. 3.
• Len Scott: «Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited», en Michael Herman y Gwilyn Hughes (eds.): Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference did it Make?, Abingdon, Routledge, 2013, pp. 5-23.
• Guillem Colom: «La segunda Guerra Fría y el desplazamiento del balance de fuerzas en Europa», Ayer, 99 (2015), pp. 175-198.
• Christopher Andrew y Oleg Gordievsky: Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations 1975-1985, Londres, Hodder & Stoughton, 1993, p. 74.
• Marcus Wolf: El hombre sin rostro, Buenos Aires, Javier Vergara, 1997, pp. 298-300.
• Guillem Colom: De la compensación a la revolución: la configuración de la política de defensa estadounidense contemporánea, 1977-2014, Madrid, Instituto Universitario Gutiérrez Mellado, 2016, pp. 70-94.
• Peter Schweizer: Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Nueva York, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994, p. 8.
• Seymour Hersh: «The Target is Destroyed»: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It, Nueva York, Random House, 1986, p. 18.
• John Hines, Ellis Mishulovich y John Shull: Soviet Intentions, 1965-1985, McLean, BDM Federal, 1995.
• Christopher Andrew y Oleg Gordievsky: More Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations, 1975-1985, Londres, Frank Cass, 1992, pp. 33-37.
• Andrei Sidorenko: The Offensive (A Soviet View), Washington DC, U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1970, p. 115.
• John Battliega: «Soviet Views of Nuclear Warfare: The Post-Cold War Interviews», en Henry Sokolski (ed.): Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute-U.S. Army War College, 2004, pp. 151-174.
• Pavel Podvig: Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2001, pp. 65-66.
• Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (RYAN Complex), Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), 6 de mayo de 1986, pp. 3-6.
• Peter Pry: War Scare: Russia and America on the nuclear brink, Westport, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999, pp. 14-15.
• Christopher Andrew y Oleg Gordievsky: Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985, Palo Alto, Standford University Press, 1994, p. 68.
• Benjamin Fischer: «CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps», International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 27-3 (2014), pp. 431-464.
• Raymond Garthoff: The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1994, p. 131.
• Benjamin Fischer: «The 1980s Soviet War Scare: New Evidence from East German Documents», Intelligence and National Security, 14-3 (1999), pp. 186-197.
• Nate Jones: «Blue’s Use of Nuclear Weapons Did Not Stop Orange’s Aggression», en The 1983 War Scare: «The Last Paroxysm» of the Cold War, parte 2, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book núm. 427, 2013, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427.
• Henry Chancellor: «1983: The Brink of Apocalypse», Channel 4, 5 de enero de 2008, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ciy5R-tLiE.
• Paul Anderson: «Decision Making by Objection and the Cuban Missile Crisis», Administrative Science Quarterly, 28-2 (1983), pp. 201-222.