¿Estuvo el mundo al borde del apocalipsis en 1983?una reinterpretación de Able Archer 83

  1. Guillem Colom Piella 1
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info

    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

Journal:
Ayer

ISSN: 1134-2277 2255-5838

Year of publication: 2023

Issue: 131

Pages: 299-326

Type: Article

DOI: 10.55509/AYER/1493 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Ayer

Abstract

One of the most unusual episodes of the Cold War took place in November 1983, coinciding with NATO’s command post exercise Able Archer 83. There is a broad consensus that Moscow miscalculated these exercises aimed at testing NATO’s nuclear release procedures as a cover for a surprise attack. Consequently, the USSR prepared to con-duct a first strike. By using available sources, this article aims to recreate the events and the prevailing interpretation to expose inconsistencies and to propose an alternative explanation: Moscow knew about the exercise and the military response was not motivated by a «war scare» but by a show of force

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